Haha, right, but the idea that “you” today is not the same subject as “you” tomorrow or yesterday does not prevent you from planning for “your” future or experiencing worries about it. In other words you still behave as if those future yous share the same locus of subjective experience as today’s you. But you don’t feel that way about your neighbour. Why not? What is the basis of that distinction? That’s what the cryonic paradox thought experiment tries to tease out. And what it shows is that there is no ontological distinction between the subjectivity of you and your neighbour. Fear makes sense in relation to your future only because that is a set of subjective experiences over which you today have some control and some direct path to, unlike your neighbour’s future. But all subjective experiences are experienced and there is no special and absolute container of selfhood that ultimately says that “you” don’t experience your neighbour’s future. We think there is only because bodies seem to provide that assurance. They do not. Perhaps some metaphysical container - aka a soul - provides it. However I have reasoned from conventional assumptions about the relationship between body and mind to show that they actually imply some quite unconventional conclusions.